Journal title ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE
Author/s Luciano Fanti
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2014/2
Language English Pages 21 P. 21-41 File size 201 KB
DOI 10.3280/POLI2014-002002
DOI is like a bar code for intellectual property: to have more infomation
click here
Below, you can see the article first page
If you want to buy this article in PDF format, you can do it, following the instructions to buy download credits
FrancoAngeli is member of Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA), a not-for-profit association which run the CrossRef service enabling links to and from online scholarly content.
The present study analyses the effects of an increase in the share of one-sided cross-ownership in a Cournot duopoly with firm-specific monopolistic unions. Since the cross-participation at ownership level implies a lower degree of competition, then in a duopoly without unions, as expected, consumer surplus and social welfare, despite the increase in the industry profits, are reduced when cross-participation increases. By contrast, when the labour market is unionised, I show the counterintuitive result that, despite the degree of competition is reduced by cross-ownership, both consumer surplus and social welfare increase with the share of cross-participation. This always occurs provided that unions are sufficiently wage-oriented. Moreover, it is shown that the results are also robust to the Bertrand mode of competition. Therefore, the policy implication is that, when wage-interested unions are in existence in oligopoly industries, a rise in cross-participation - i.e. a lower degree of competition - is socially preferred.
Keywords: Cross-ownership, duopoly, unions, social welfare
Jel codes: D43, L13, L4, J51
Luciano Fanti, Welfare effects of cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly in "ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE " 2/2014, pp 21-41, DOI: 10.3280/POLI2014-002002