Are social mechanisms the antonym of laws?

Journal title EPISTEMOLOGIA
Author/s Amparo Gómez Rodríguez
Publishing Year 2015 Issue 2015/1
Language Italian Pages 16 P. 31-46 File size 78 KB
DOI 10.3280/EPIS2015-001003
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The thesis that in social sciences causal explanations are possible only in terms of mechanisms due to the lack of genuine laws has been increasingly popular among social scientists and philosophers. In this article it is examined whether the explanation by mechanisms is necessarily an explanation without laws or, on the contrary, it can involve some kind of laws. To this end it is argued, firstly, that mechanisms are not always the antonym of laws insofar as they express propensities and so tendencies; secondly, that these tendencies are causal and entail capacities and dispositions; thirdly, that capacities and dispositions involved in human behaviour have to face the problem of free will; and finally, reasons are offered in favor of considering causal tendencies as authentic laws. The ultimate aim of this article is to demonstrate that explanation of social facts can involve well-established laws in its explanans, although they are not universal laws.

La tesi che nelle scienze sociali le spiegazioni causali sono possibili solo in termini di meccanismi, data l’assenza di vere e proprie leggi, è diventata sempre più popolare tra gli scienziati e i filosofi sociali. In questo articolo si esamina se la spiegazione mediante meccanismi sia necessariamente una spiegazione senza leggi oppure se, al contrario, possa implicare qualche tipo di legge. A tal fine si argomenta, in primo luogo, che i meccanismi non sono sempre l’opposto delle leggi, nella misura in cui esprimono propensioni e quindi tendenze; in secondo luogo, che queste tendenze hanno carattere causale e implicano capacità e disposizioni; in terzo luogo, che le capacità e le disposizioni implicate nel comportamento umano debbono affrontare il problema della libera volontà; finalmente si offrono ragioni per considerare le tendenze causali come vere e proprie leggi. Lo scopo ultimo di questo articolo è dimostrare che la spiegazione dei fatti sociali può implicare il coinvolgimento nell’explanans di leggi ben stabilite, ancorché esse non siano leggi universali.

Keywords: Meccanismi, capacità, disposizioni, tendenze, leggi sociali, spiegazione causale

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Amparo Gómez Rodríguez, Are social mechanisms the antonym of laws? in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 1/2015, pp 31-46, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2015-001003