Criminalità organizzata e sindacato: repertori di elusione attraverso la mediazione di datori di lavoro e lavoratori. Il caso del processo ‘Aemilia’ Organized Crime and Trade Unions: schemes to circumvent the law through the mediation of employers and employees. The case of the ‘Aemilia’ trial

Journal title SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO
Author/s Anna Mori, Federica Cabras
Publishing Year 2026 Issue 2026/174
Language Italian Pages 29 P. 209-237 File size 381 KB
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This article examines the strategies through which the criminal organization ’ndrangheta has managed to circumvent the role and action of trade unions and to spread illicit labour practices in Emilia-Romagna, a “non-traditional” context of criminal eradication, characterized by high union density and the presence of antagonistic trade unions. Drawing on the Aemilia trial and combining analysis of 7,721 pages of judicial documents with 20 in-depth interviews with key informants, the article reconstructs a repertoire of actions deployed by the criminal organization to weaken trade union agency. The findings show that the ’ndrangheta avoided direct interactions with unions, instead favouring a strategy of “institutional elusion” mediated by employers and workers. This strategy relies on the creation and control of firms, the exploitation of productive fragmentation through contracting and subcontracting, and the employment of a vulnerable and easily coercible workforce, with significant consequences for workers’ representation and protection.

Keywords: institutional elusion; ’ndrangheta; trade unions; Aemilia trial

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Anna Mori, Federica Cabras, Criminalità organizzata e sindacato: repertori di elusione attraverso la mediazione di datori di lavoro e lavoratori. Il caso del processo ‘Aemilia’ in "SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO " 174/2026, pp 209-237, DOI: