Journal title MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Author/s Silvia Gaia
Publishing Year 2013 Issue 2013/2 Language Italian
Pages 18 P. 111-128 File size 711 KB
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This paper investigates the roles that optimal contracting and rent-extraction theories play in explaining the variation of CEO remuneration during the financial crisis in a sample of 140 Italian non-financial firms listed in the period 2007-2009. By using an OLS regression model, results show that Italian firms reacted to the financial crisis by increasing fixed remuneration in order to reduce CEO losses caused by the decrease of variable remuneration and/or of the value of the company shares owned. These findings are consistent with rent-extraction theory, as CEO remuneration seems to be a tool for extracting a rent rather than a solution for agency problems. This study offers insights to policy-makers that should mandate higher transparency on the criteria used by Italian companies in setting fixed remuneration and enhance the protection of minority shareholders’ rights.
Keywords: CEO remuneration, firm performance, rent-extraction, financial crisis.
Silvia Gaia, La remunerazione dell’amministratore delegato durante la crisi finanziaria: un’analisi empirica in "MANAGEMENT CONTROL" 2/2013, pp 111-128, DOI: 10.3280/MACO2013-002006