L’aumento dei requisiti di capitale minimo delle banche: alcune considerazioni

Author/s Giovanni B. Pittaluga
Publishing Year 2017 Issue 2016/3 Language Italian
Pages 14 P. 409-422 File size 453 KB
DOI 10.3280/ED2016-003004
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Following the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Basel III introduced minimum capital requirements much stricter than before. This should ensure a higher stability of the banking and financial systems of member countries to this agreement. However, the European Commission has implemented Basel III smoothing some points. Such behavior reflects not only the bank-centric financial structure of the continental European countries, but also the particular cyclical phase of this area, in primis of the Eurozone. In the latter, in particular, it tends to emerge a possible contradiction between a markedly rigorous supervisory policy and a decidedly expansionary monetary policy.

Keywords: Minimum capital requirements, Basel III, Modigliani-Miller, banks’ financial structure.

Jel codes: G21, G28

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Giovanni B. Pittaluga, L’aumento dei requisiti di capitale minimo delle banche: alcune considerazioni in "ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO " 3/2016, pp 409-422, DOI: 10.3280/ED2016-003004