The revision of art. 81 of the Constitution: abdication of the financial sovereignty and opacity of the budget package

Author/s Giuseppe Di Gaspare
Publishing Year 2018 Issue 2018/2 Language Italian
Pages 15 P. 43-57 File size 208 KB
DOI 10.3280/DC2018-002004
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In this essay, the author claims that the new version of the art. 81 of the Italian Constitution is not aimed to implement the Fiscal compact and to reintroduce the substantial balanced budget principle; instead, it leads to the disappearance of financial sovereignty of the State and its subordination to the global financial speculation. Indeed, the application of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of March 2012 was not conditional on the adoption of a constitutional provision, since - in order to be binding - the accord would require only a ratification by an ordinary law. The actual reason of the revision of art. 81 of the Constitution is due to the "automatic" inclusion in the budget, without a specific Parliament’s awareness of any increased burdens of the servicing public debt.

Keywords: Fiscal compact; Costituzione; bilancio; debito pubblico; Palamento; UE; Fiscal compact; Constitution; economic balance; public debt.

Giuseppe Di Gaspare, L’art. 81 Cost. novellato: abdicazione della sovranità finanziaria ed opacità della manovra di bilancio in "DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE" 2/2018, pp 43-57, DOI: 10.3280/DC2018-002004